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Editor’s introduction
“A spectre is haunting South Asia—the spectre of Maoism,” the Financial 
Times rather melodramatically announced in April 2006, reporting that 
the Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, had described Maoist guer-
rillas as “the single greatest threat to Indian national security”. The scale 
of the Maoist-led insurgency in rural India has surprised and alarmed 
ruling classes for whom Marxism-Leninism was supposed to have been 
safely confined to the dustbin of history after 1989. The Indian Maoists 
have also become a subject of discussion on the left both in India and 
internationally. In particular, a recent article by the writer and campaigner 
Arundhati Roy describing her visit to a Maoist-controlled area attracted 
much controversy.
In the following piece, the Indian Marxist scholar and activist Jairus 
Banaji offers a much more critical analysis of Indian Maoism than Roy pro-
vides. But first here is a little background to help the reader unfamiliar with 
Indian politics and society (see also the glossary).
India is by far the most important country in the world where 
Communism remains a powerful political force. Reflecting the twists and 
turns of Moscow’s foreign policy, the Communist Party of India (CPI) 
during the struggle for national liberation from Britain had an ambiva-
lent relationship to the dominant nationalist party, the Indian National 
:  Johnson, 006.
:  Roy, 00a.
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Congress. But its role in different social movements gave it a significant 
popular base. After independence was won in 1947, Congress-ruled India 
pursued a policy of neutrality in the Cold War that led to a strategic part-
nership with the Soviet Union. Moscow’s demands that the CPI moderate 
its opposition to Congress caused increasing tensions within the party. 
These were exacerbated by the split in 1960 between the USSR 
and China under Mao Zedong, who denounced the Soviet leader Nikita 
Khrushchev’s policy of “peaceful coexistence” with the West. The rise of 
Maoism, purporting to offer a more radical version of Marxism-Leninism than 
Moscow, divided the international Communist movement. Nowhere was 
this more true than in India. The 1962 border war between India and China 
deepened the divisions within the CPI, and in 1964 the pro-China faction 
broke away to form the Communist Party of India (Marxist,) or CPI(M).
The new party’s rhetoric was more radical than the CPI’s, and indeed 
it remains strongly “Marxist-Leninist”, not to say Stalinist. But in practice 
the CPI(M) has pursued the same kind of parliamentary strategy that the 
pro-Moscow CPI also continues to follow. This has brought the CPI(M) 
a significant degree of success in bourgeois politics, particularly at the level 
of state governments (India has a quasi-federal political system in which the 
states have significant powers). Today the CPI(M) is the largest left party 
in India, dominating the state governments of West Bengal, Kerala, and 
Tripura. But the gap between rhetoric and practice has grown, as these 
governments implement neoliberal policies that have caused internal con-
flicts within the party as well as clashes with popular movements.
It was the same gap that gave rise to Indian Maoism proper in the 
late 1960s. At a time when the Chinese Cultural Revolution was inspiring 
young radicals everywhere, the CPI(M) itself split as Charu Mazumdar and 
other local leaders in West Bengal placed themselves at the head of a rising 
in the Naxalbari district. Banaji’s article traces the subsequent develop-
ment of the Indian Maoists. It is worth underlining that, as he notes, they 
continue to operate within an ideological framework that, in common 
with the more mainstream Communist parties, treats India as a “feudal” or 
“semi-feudal” society, but that follows Mao in treating the peasantry as the 
key revolutionary force.
In fact, India is a thoroughly capitalist society, though one shaped 
by the process of uneven and combined development that Neil Davidson 
discusses elsewhere in this issue. A large proportion of the rural poor in 
India consists of workers drawn from the so-called “Scheduled Castes” 
:  Sarkar, 007.
131International Socialism
and “Scheduled Tribes”, that is, those who have traditionally been at the 
bottom of the caste hierarchy or beyond its pale and subject to centuries 
of domination. Today the Scheduled Castes are generally referred to as 
“Dalits”, with the general sense of the crushed or oppressed, and the tribals 
known as “Adivasis”, a term that highlights their character as the original 
inhabitants of the subcontinent. 
The bulk of the Scheduled Castes are agricultural labourers. They have 
worked, traditionally, as farm servants and casual labourers for a substantial 
peasantry drawn from the upper castes and so-called OBCs (Other Backward 
Classes). In Andhra Pradesh where the Naxalites sank deep roots in the 1970s, 
over 70 percent of Dalits are landless labourers. With the great awakening that 
swept through these masses for much of the 20th century, large parts of rural 
and small-town India saw a pro-slavery rebellion of sorts by the late 1970s 
and a dramatic increase in the number of caste atrocities, that is, murderous 
assaults on Dalits, their families and their settlements. 
For their part, Adivasis make up a little under 10 percent of the 
country’s population (some 84 million at the last count), with the bulk of 
them concentrated in the central Indian states of Chhattisgarh, Madhya 
Pradesh, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. The Santals in eastern India and 
the Gonds of central India are among the largest groups numerically, and 
both have figured prominently in the Maoist movement. The Adivasis 
are mostly forest dwellers and migrant workers, the vast majority of them 
sunk in an abject poverty whose chief causes have been expanding state 
control of the forests and the encroachment of non-tribals. 
But the last two decades have seen strong tribal resistance to the 
expansion of mining capital as the reopening of India to the world economy 
increased competition among both Indian states and industrial capitals and 
encouraged a quite scandalous exploitation of non-renewable resources in 
the resource-rich tribal belts of Orissa, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand that 
remain among the most impoverished parts of the country. The picture is 
one of unabated ecological depletion (which includes a rampant growth of 
illegal mining and the widespread use of open cast mining techniques) and 
a continuing displacement of tribals. Elsewhere in the countryside millions 
of agricultural labourers from the Dalit and other communities face the 
grim prospect of growing joblessness and land hunger, because the central 
government is unwilling to risk the kind of confrontation with state legis-
latures that any substantial tackling of these issues will inevitably bring. 
AC
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Glossary
Adivasis: the term for tribals (Scheduled Tribes in official parlance), signifying their 
character as the original inhabitants of the subcontinent; called girijans (“hill people”) 
in Andhra Pradesh; the majority are forest dwellers.
BJP: Bharatiya Janata Party, currently the main opposition party and the parliamentary face 
of a network of organisations whose stated aim is the replacement of India’s democracy 
by a Hindu state. This conglomerate, controlled by the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak 
Sangh), is India’s closest parallel to a fascist movement, seeking to win support among 
Hindus by targeting minorities. The BJP was behind the horrific communal violence 
in Gujarat in 00.
CRPF: Central Reserve Police Force, the chief paramilitary force involved in 
counterinsurgency operations
Dalits: the name (self-description) now generally used for the Scheduled Castes; it has the 
general sense of “the crushed” or “the oppressed”; the bulk of them are landless and 
many have converted to Buddhism or Christianity.
podu: shifting cultivation 
zamindars: landowners; used loosely of the dominant group in village society 
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A rough periodisation of the Maoist movement in India might read as follows: (1) The seminal years of “Naxalism” from the late 1960s 
to the end of 1972 were defined by a split from the Communist Party 
of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)) in 1967 when a large-scale exodus began, 
and by mass upsurges in various parts of West Bengal, in largely tribal-
dominated districts, and in Srikakulam along the Andhra coast, construed 
by the split-away “Marxist-Leninists” as uprisings of the peasantry and 
struggles for state power. (2) A period from the main part of the 1970s 
to the 1980s, when the movement reassembled itself outside Bengal, 
chiefly in central and southern Bihar and in the Telangana region of 
Andhra Pradesh. Here two major “armed-struggle” tendencies survived 
with substantial continuity through the whole of the 1970s: the Chandra 
Pulla Reddy group and a group around Kondapalli Seetharamaiah. (3) 
A dramatic escalation of conflict from 1985 that would lead eventually 
to a wholesale militarisation of the movement in the 1990s and to the 
civil war that is currently raging in the tribal heartlands of the formerly 
undivided district of Bastar in the state of Chhattisgarh. 
If the party launched by Charu Mazumdar in April 1969 had disin-
tegrated by 1971 and fragmentation remained a characteristic of the Maoist 
groups throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the most recent phase has seen a 
series of mergers and a more consolidated Maoist movement. Today the two 
major currents of Indian Naxalism are the CPI (Marxist-Leninist) (from here 
on, Liberation) which is a more or less open party that has contested elections 
since the late 1970s, and the CPI (Maoist), which is waging the guerrilla war 
in Bastar and parts of Orissa. When the Indian government describes Maoism 
as the country’s biggest “internal security threat”, it is referring not to all the 
various Maoist parties, which are still numerous, but specifically to the CPI 
(Maoist) which emerged in 2004 as a merger between People’s War (PW) and 
the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI). PW was itself the outcome of 
a merger between the People’s War Group (PWG) founded by Seetharamaiah 
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and a Bihar-based party, Party Unity. Unlike Liberation, the PWG had been 
banned (on and off) for most of its history, and so of course is its avatar, 
the CPI (Maoist).
Andhra Pradesh has always been the true backbone of Indian Maoism. 
It was the only state in the country where the Maoists were in a majority 
in mid-1967, when a series of state-level coordination committees revolted 
against the CPI(M) leadership, egged on by the Chinese Communist Party’s 
(CCP) call for a fight against “revisionism”. “The party lost 60 percent of its 
membership in the state,” with Nagi Reddy carrying 11 of the 14 district 
committees with him. But the Andhra Maoists stayed out of the All India 
Co-ordination Committee of Revolutionaries in November 1967. When 
the dissidents either left or were forced out of the CPI(M) and the coordina-
tion of state committees renamed itself the All India Coordination Committee 
of Communist Revolutionaries (AICCCR) by the middle of 1968, it had 
more or less committed itself to forming a separate party. 
Yet, as Mohan Ram wrote, “there was intense confusion in the 
AICCCR about the priorities towards building a party and about the kind of 
party to be built”. For Charu Mazumdar “the primary condition for building 
such a party was to organise armed struggle in the countryside”. “The major 
task of revolutionaries was to plunge into work among the peasant masses and 
set up revolutionary bases”. Mazumdar “had nothing to say about the role of 
mass organisations and the accent was on a secret party”.6 
The divisions within the AICCCR were essentially on the issue of mass 
work and whether a party formed in this way, with middle class youth being 
sent out to “rouse the peasant masses in the countryside” to “wage guerrilla 
war” and “build rural base areas”,7 would be in a position to sustain armed 
struggle. Brushing these differences aside, the Communist Party of India 
(Marxist-Leninist), or CPI(M-L), was formed on 22 April 1969 and launched 
at a May Day gathering that year, and had more or less disintegrated by 1971, 
with a section led by Bihar’s Satya Narayan Singh dissociating itself from 
:  Ram, 97, p8.
:  I shall use the term “Andhra” as shorthand for the state of Andhra Pradesh; Andhra 
otherwise refers to the largely coastal region within the state.
:  Ram, 97, p8.
:  Ram, 97, p8.
:  Ram, 97, p86.
6:  Ram, 97, p87.
7:  Duyker, 987, p79, citing the CPI(M-L)’s “Resolution on Party Organisation” dated  
April 969.
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Mazumdar.8 Singh (or “SNS”, as he was called) had described Mazumdar’s 
line as “individual terrorism” as early as July 1970.9 By November that year 
“a majority of the CPI(M-L)’s 21-member Central Committee withdrew 
support from Mazumdar”, and he was expelled from the party in 1971.0
The CCP had come down heavily on Mazumdar, denouncing his 
conception of annihilation as “secret assassination”, claiming he had no 
agrarian programme, and describing his “policy” as “wrong”. Most substan-
tially, it argued, “Without mass struggle and mass organisation, the peasants’ 
armed struggle cannot be sustained.” “Regarding the formulation that if a 
revolutionary does not make his hands red with the blood of class enemies, 
then he is not a Communist; if this be the yardstick of a Communist, then 
that Communist Party cannot remain a Communist Party”. Top leaders like 
Kanu Sanyal, in jail by 1972, referred to their “great disappointment, regret 
and disgust” at the fact that Mazumdar had refused to learn any lessons from 
the “valuable suggestions” of the CCP. 
Class roots of revolt
Naxalbari in the north of West Bengal became a template for the Indian 
revolution and gave the Naxalites their names. But there was no serious 
attempt by the Maoist leadership to look at the nature of the struggles there 
or in Midnapore (Medinipur) or Srikakulam or Kondamodalu. For example, 
Duyker notes that in the Santal-inhabited areas of Debra and Gopiballavpur 
(in Midnapore) the Naxalites succeeded in “mobilising large numbers of lan-
dless labourers and sharecroppers”. There was widespread landlessness among 
the Santals of districts like Midnapore and Birbhum, and it was essentially 
these landless tribals who formed the backbone of the mass agitations that the 
new party led in 1969, in harvesting campaigns that Mazumdar himself was 
opposed to! The rural upsurges in Midnapore and Birbhum coincided with the 
monsoons when “the landless could least expect to gain work”. 
In Naxalbari, in the Siliguri subdivision of Darjeeling in the north, the 
8:  Mohanty, 977, pxx.
9:  Mohanty, 977, p.
0:  Mohanty, 977, p.
:  Sanyal, 97, p, citing excerpts from a letter received from the CCP in November 
970.
:  Duyker, 987, p8.
:  Duyker, 987, pp–6.
:  Duyker, 987, p8, citing the testimony of Santosh Rana who led the movement in 
Gopiballavpur, with his wife and brother.
:  Duyker, 987, p0.
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land occupations that mushroomed between March and May 1967 involved 
Santal tea garden labourers who worked as sharecroppers on the excess land 
of the estates.6 The local leadership here, Kanu Sanyal and Jangal Santhal, did 
not subscribe to the strategy of small squad actions and concentrated on mass 
agitation.7 The agitation (on issues like eviction of sharecroppers and recovery 
of excess land) was given the character of a nascent insurgency because the 
Santals were armed with bows and arrows and remained “poised for attacks 
on police parties”,8 as the CPI(M)-led United Front government decided to 
break the movement with large-scale arrests and hundreds of tribals fled to the 
forest where they formed ill-armed and inexperienced guerrilla units besieged 
by a massive police force.9 By August wholesale surrenders began to take 
place—the government had succeeded in breaking the movement by force. 
In the Srikakulam Agency Area the bulk of Adivasis (or Girijans, 
as they were called here) were agricultural labourers.0 Andhra Pradesh 
accounts for the highest incidence of tribal land alienation in the country, 
with non-tribals owning more than half the land in the scheduled areas. 
Thus here landlessness stemmed from a widespread process of dispossession 
that had occurred on a larger scale in the coastal tracts of Andhra where 
primitive accumulation by the state and by moneylenders involved the sup-
pression of customary rights like podu and the appropriation of large tracts of 
land either as “state forests” or land seized by non-tribals. In Srikakulam the 
Communists had built a broad-based organisation of tribals by the late 1950s, 
and the land occupations and crop seizures that exploded in 1968 were 
directed as much against those forces as against any abstract “feudalism”. 
In Kondamodalu in East Godavari “the first demand that was taken up [by 
the party] concerned the indebtedness of the tribals and their exploitation 
by the moneylenders”, but “the issue on which the movement really picked 
up was farm wages”. Here the land seizures of 1969 targeted land that had 
been alienated to the non-tribals or mortgaged to moneylenders and did not 
include “the ‘self-cultivated lands’ of the landlords over which the tribals as 
yet felt they had no claim”. 
6:  Samanta, 98, pp6, 77.
7:  Samanta, 98, p79.
8:  Duyker, 987, p7, citing the Times of India,  May 967.
9:  Duyker, 987, pp7-7.
0:  Mohanty, 977, p9.
:  See the study of this by Rao, Deshingkar and Farrington, 006.
:  Ram, 97, p89.
:  Sinha, 989, p9.
:  Sinha, 989, pp9–9.
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The movement in Srikakulam was crushed by the middle of 1970 
and a period of decline set in. Mazumdar died in custody in July 1972. On 
one estimate, by March 1973 there were some 17,787 Naxalite prisoners in 
West Bengal alone.6 Shock attacks on the class enemy had had disastrous 
results. In Andhra, Nagi Reddy’s group, the Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary 
Communist Committee (APRCC), argued, “Some persons, forming them-
selves into groups and without any relation to the mass movement, attack the 
landlords and other exploiters. We want to make it clear that these attacks 
carried on without any relation to a mass revolutionary movement cannot 
enable us to dissolve feudalism”.7 Annihilations would not “annihilate the 
system or the forms of exploitation”.8 The CPI(M-L)’s “methodology made 
the people feel that someone else and not they were the liberators”.9 
The setback was so severe that the CPI(M-L) fragmented rapidly 
and was badly divided in the months leading up to the state of emer-
gency declared by prime minister Indira Gandhi in June 1975. During 
the emergency of 1975-7 some ten Maoist groups were banned and an 
estimated 40,000 cadres were in jail.0 But within the Maoist mainstream 
the disintegration of the Central Committee spawned repeated attempts 
at reunification. Nagi Reddy, who had been opposed to the forma-
tion of a centralised party and had repeatedly emphasised the need for 
a longish period of mass work, teamed up with Parimal Das Gupta (one 
of Mazumdar’s earliest critics) and others nationally to form the Unity 
Centre of Communist Revolutionaries of India (Marxist-Leninist). This 
more or less disintegrated when Nagi Reddy died in 1975. In Andhra 
itself Nagi Reddy’s group was the weakest of the three groups that existed 
there in the 1970s. The Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist 
Party led by Chandra Pulla Reddy, the strongest group in the state 
in the 1970s, defended the armed defence of the cadres in the face of 
repression, but combined this with mass struggles or at least the need for 
an active mobilisation of masses in struggle. 
Despite this, CP Reddy supported SNS’s drive to regroup the CPI(M-
:  Mohanty, 977, p78: “When the period of decline of the CPI(M-L) started in the 
middle of 970”.
6:  Duyker, 987, p.
7:  Cited in Ram, 97, p6.
8:  Sinha, 989, p79, summarising the APRCC position.
9:  Ram, 97, p9.
0:  Mohanty, 977, pxxi.
:  Dubey, 99, p6.
:  Sinha, 989, p8.
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L) and was part of the “Provisional Central Committee”, till he split in 1980. 
Thus the C P Reddy group absorbed very different sorts of influences. It 
would abandon the boycottism of the CPI(M-L) and start contesting elec-
tions from 1978, even winning a seat in the Andhra Assembly elections. It 
was also the C P Reddy group that was first active in forming the Ryothu 
Coolie Sanghams or agricultural labour unions. These spread rapidly in the 
late 1970s and were a key factor in creating substantial popular support for 
the Naxals in Andhra. The third Maoist group in Andhra was in some ways 
the most orthodox, since its leader, Kondapalli Seetharamaiah, had joined 
the AICCCR early in 1969, and when the Central Committee disintegrated 
Seetharamaiah was the Andhra face of the “pro-Charu” Central Organising 
Committee (COC). These coordinations meant little in practice, since the 
Andhra Maoists were largely independent in their evolution.  
In the general retreat and disintegration of the CPI(M-L) that domi-
nated the early 1970s, both CP Reddy and the Andhra COC retained the 
elements of a squad organisation in north Telangana, and again the issues 
were less those of a peasantry than of the purely landless and Scheduled 
Caste labourers and farm servants in districts like Karimnagar and of tribals 
and other working people in the Godavari valley region. Unlike the insane 
putschism that had controlled and destroyed the party under Mazumdar’s 
leadership, Telangana in the late 1970s and early 1980s saw major develop-
ments that laid the groundwork for the “people’s war” of the 1990s and 
2000s. The PWG, formed in 1980, had substantial control of Telangana by 
the end of the 1980s, and it is crucial to see why. 
The reason, as the late human rights acivist K Balagopal explained, 
was that “unlike the rest of [Andhra] where the Naxalites spread through the 
armed squads, in northern Telangana there was a clear period in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s…when it was the mass organisations, mainly the agricultural 
labourers’ associations and the student and youth fronts, that were the instru-
ment for the spread of Maoism as an ideology and a political practice”.6 That 
phase “was soon to pass and the people would start depending on the armed 
squads for justice”.7 But Seetharamaiah, who attracted the younger generation 
to his group in large numbers,8 saw no conflict between mass organisation and 
:  Balagopal and Reddy, 98, p897 onwards. 
:  The best account of these struggles is Balagopal and Reddy, 98.
:  Singh, 99, p09, citing the editor of Andhra Prabha: “The PWG practically runs a 
‘parallel government’ in Karimnagar, Warangal and Adilabad districts.”
6:  Balagopal, 006a, p8.
7:  Balagopal, 006a, p8.
8:  Sinha, 989, p8.
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armed struggle,9 and their combined impact was to strike “fatally at the 
power relations of rural Telangana society” and endow “the poor, the Dalits 
and the tribals with a voice of their own and the courage to speak out”.0 For 
all the violence they unleashed, their own and the even worse, more widely 
spread violence of the state in Andhra, it was possible for Balagopal to main-
tain that  “there is this fear that if the Naxalites go away, ‘the poor cannot 
survive’.” 
If the PWG emerged as the dominant group in Andhra, even more 
so when the CP Reddy group split in 1984, in Bihar the field was equally 
divided between Liberation, Party Unity and the Maoist Communist 
Centre (MCC). A key factor in the survival of the PWG was its expansion 
into the largely tribal districts of Telangana, where the cadre encouraged 
tribals to cut down and cultivate reserved forests, forced a substantial 
increase in the wages paid by tendu leaf contractors, and put an end to the 
harassment Adivasis suffered at the hands of forest officials and the police. In 
Bihar the oppression of the rural poor took a different form. Though called 
“zamindars” by the labourers, the Bhumihars of districts like Bhojpur were 
in fact a substantial peasantry (kisans) and the suppression of the rural poor 
was as much a struggle for dignity (izzat), that is, for freedom from violence 
and caste oppression, as a struggle over wages and land rights. The violent 
colonial repression of the military labour markets of North India had done 
little to modify the warrior ethos of zamindars and peasants alike in states 
like Bihar, and the Dalits who formed the bulk of labourers (mazdoors) 
knew that “any open challenge to upper and middle caste domination 
would eventually and inevitably result in armed violence”. 
One student claimed that in the village he studied most Dalits 
“wanted the Maoist armed squads to remain in the area as they feared that 
the landlords would re-establish their dominance” if the Maoists with-
drew.6 Another was told, “Because we have arms, the zamindars have 
shrunk with fear”.7 Thus all of the main Bihar groups were committed 
9:  Sinha, 989, p8, citing a PWG document: “the armed form of struggle is not the only 
form of struggle.”
0:  Balagopal, 997, p.
:  Balagopal, 006a, p8. 
:  Balagopal, 990b, pp88-88.
:  Tendu is the leaf from which beedis (cigarettes) are made.
:  Richards, 00, pp98-99. 
:  Kunnath, 009, p9.
6:  Kunnath, 009, p0; see Bhatia, 00, p, for a similar narrative about the 
origins of Party Unity in Jehanabad district.
7:  Bhatia, 00, p6.
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to “armed struggle” to one degree or another. The Naxalites who were 
brought into Bhojpur in the late 1960s would later split from the CPI(M-L) 
(pro-Mazumdar, pro-Lin Piao faction) led by Mahadeb Mukherjee without 
gravitating to S N Singh’s Central Committee at the other end of the pro/
anti-Mazumdar spectrum.8 Liberation was the outcome of the new Central 
Committee formed in July 1974 by Subroto Datta alias Jowhar, the young 
leader of this “third” tendency, and of the three Bihar parties was the one 
that showed the most substantial evolution in terms of seeking strategies for 
both survival and growth.9 
In an extraordinary combination of legal and illegal work, Liberation 
floated a front organisation, the Indian People’s Front (IPF), that contested 
50 seats in the Bihar Assembly elections of 1985,0 even as its armed squads 
pulled off over 60 “annihilations” between 1980 and 1984! Much of this 
violence was part of the titanic struggle the Bihar groups were engaged in 
against the caste-based private militias formed by the Bhumihars, Kurmis 
and other landed castes in their drive to exterminate Naxalism from the 
plains of Bihar. This warfare dominated the whole of the 1980s and much 
of the 1990s, and while the CPI(M-L) was successful in fighting the smaller 
militias, it was drawn inexorably into a caste dynamic that shaped the nature 
of the movement and its struggles. 
Party Unity, formed in 1982, successfully fought the Bhoomi Sena in 
Jehanabad, but by the 1990s it drew much of its support from the Kurmis, 
and its Dalit supporters (all of them workers) felt deserted and betrayed. The 
MCC, which had evolved from Dakshin Desh, one of the Maoist groups 
that had stayed out of the AICCCR and eventually built its base in Jharkhand 
(then south Bihar) had a large following among Yadavs, and became deeply 
embroiled in caste vendettas that involved horrific massacres on all sides. The 
MCC had no interest in open organisations of any sort;6 Party Unity’s style 
of politics effectively drove its one open front, the Mazdoor Kisan Sangram 
8:  Dubey, 99, p79.
9:  Dubey, 99, pp8-86. He was killed in November 97 and Vinod Mishra became 
the leader.
0:  Dubey, 99, p.
:  Dubey, 99, p.
:  Dubey, 99, p.
:  Kunnath, 009, pp onwards.
:  Mohanty, 006, p6.
:  See, for example, Liberation’s description of the MCC as “practitioners of caste war” 
(jati sangharsh chalanewala)—Dubey, 99, p7.
6:  Dubey, 99, p.
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Samiti, underground (which was banned in 1986);7 and Liberation had to 
disband the IPF in 1994, worried that its popularity was actually a threat 
to the “identity of the party”!8 Finally, not the least of the problems with 
this total absorption in left wing militarism (less true of Liberation which 
seems to have dismantled its squads by the late 1990s) has been the armed 
clashes between the various Naxal groups, involving the liquidation of each 
other’s cadre.9
Militarisation of the struggle
The late 1980s saw a dramatic escalation of conflict once the PWG took 
the fateful decision to target the state directly by mounting attacks on the 
police, inaugurating a spiral of violence that has not abated till today. “It 
was in July 1985 that the first incident of deliberate murder of a policeman 
by the Naxalites took place; that was in Jagtial, a ‘disturbed area’ of 
Karimnagar, where the police in collusion with armed BJP landlords had 
been subjecting Naxalite youth to repeated and savage torture”.60 Balagopal 
himself referred to these escalating levels of violence as a “new” phase. 
They would transform the conflict into a full-scale war, with sizeable para-
military forces converting Telangana and the adjoining forest areas into a 
“vast police camp” and with a profound militarisation of the PWG itself.6 
By the end of the 1980s “whole tribal hamlets were set on fire to teach 
them a lesson not to harbour Naxalites”.6 By 1997 Balagopal could write 
that “the 1990s have seen an unprecedented escalation in the magnitude 
of the killings. More than 60 percent of the encounter killings of the [last] 
three decades have taken place in the last six years”.6 
7:  Dubey, 99, pp–.
8:  Bhatia, 00, p6: “IPF had to be disbanded in 99 because it had become so 
popular that the identity of the party itself was at stake.”
9:  Dubey, 99, p6, describes armed clashes emerging between Party Unity and 
Liberation by the late 980s; they continued to slaughter each other in the 990s. Balagopal, 
990b, p88, refers to the “murderous assaults the Naxalite groups have been making 
upon each other”, meaning mainly PWG attacks on CP Reddy cadre which left 0 dead on 
both sides in a period of just five months in 990. Finally, see Kumar, 00, p98: “ In a 
booklet brought out in August 00, the CPI (M-L) Liberation claims that the People’s War 
killed  [of its] supporters between 998 and 00.” 
60:  Balagopal, 990a, p9.
6:  Singh, 99, p, a phrase penned, ironically, by a retired police officer, one time 
director general of the Border Security Force!
6:  Balagopal, 990a, p9; see Balagopal, 987, p7, for the burning of tribal hamlets, 
of the Koyas in east Godavari and the Konds in Visakhapatnam.
6:  Balagopal, 997, p7.
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Since then, over the period 1997 to 2007, the Andhra Pradesh Civil 
Liberties Committee has recorded roughly 1,800 “encounter” killings 
by the police.6 It is crucial to note that the vast majority of the victims of 
these extra-judicial killings are Dalits and tribals, many of them with no direct 
connection to the Naxalites. The culture of impunity extended to the police 
establishment by the two dominant parties in the state has left a pall of fear 
hanging over large parts of Telangana,6 and though it has driven the PWG 
into the forests of Bastar and the border districts of Orissa, spawning the delu-
sion that Andhra has solved its Naxalite problem, the sheer incoherence of 
the state’s strategies (repeated banning of the PWG, repeated legalisation and 
unmitigated repression) has left a legacy of substantial underlying support for 
the CPI (Maoist) (or former PWG) leaders in Andhra itself.66 For the radical 
left, the key issue is whether the armed struggle that has now been displaced to 
the adjoining districts in Chhattisgarh and Orissa is truly the form of a move-
ment for socialist emancipation and the kind of political culture it wants and 
sees as viable in a country as vast and complex as India. Before coming to this, 
we should look briefly at the latest phase of the conflict.    
Bastar is today the frontline of the “explosive Naxal battle” that is 
retailed to millions of households in India through the news channels. PWG’s 
expansion into Bastar and Gadchiroli began in the early 1980s, fleeing early 
waves of repression in Andhra, and by 1989 the party felt strong enough to 
form a mass “peasant” front called the Dandakaranya Adivasi Kisan Mazdoor 
Sanghatana,67 backed by a series of armed squads that contained something 
under 200 cadres.68 These expanded rapidly in the early 1990s, a period when 
Seetharamaiah was hounded out of the party and a new, younger leadership 
consolidated its hold. In fact, the 1990s threw up an explosive conjuncture. 
As state governments began dreaming of the fabulous sums of money 
to be made from the mineral-rich tribal districts they had abandoned to 
decades of oppression and misery, the PWG rapidly militarised itself, with 
major increases in lethality (vastly more sophisticated weaponry including 
the extensive use of landmines), an elaborate organisation of platoons, bat-
talions and military commands, and new expansion into the tribal districts 
of southern Orissa. By 2001 the party (now called People’s War) decided to 
intensify the war in ten states,69 and in 2004 PW and the MCCI merged to 
6:  Economic and Political Weekly editorial, 009, p6.
6:  Balagopal, 00, p7.
66:  See Kannabiran, 00.
67:  Navlakha, 00, pp–.
68:  People’s Union of Civil Liberties, 989, p9.
69:  Dash, 006, p9.
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form the CPI (Maoist). 
With police forces too demoralised to handle the insurgency, in 
Chhattisgarh the BJP government secretly funded and armed a “private” 
lynch mob called Salwa Judum (“Purification Hunt” in Gondi) that has 
since emptied hundreds of villages by forcing inhabitants into internally dis-
placed persons camps where they can be easily controlled. “Large swaths of 
Dantewara are now abandoned. Villages in Salwa Judum-controlled areas that 
refuse to cooperate are deemed ‘Maoist’ villages, and are then attacked”.70 
On one count, some 40,000 tribals have been herded into these camps and 
others have fled deep into the forest or across the border into Khammam. 
Meanwhile, in the last year the Maoists have inflicted major losses on the 
CRPF (the official military operation in Chhattisgarh), forcing the central 
government to take control of counterinsurgency operations. The wholesale 
militarisation of the movement since the 1990s has culminated in a vanguard 
war trapped in an expanding culture of counterinsurgency, with tens of thou-
sands of civilians caught between them.7
The critique of arms
In 2006 K Balagopal wrote, “Nothing justifies the tendency in demo-
cratic circles to talk as if all that is relevant for understanding the role of 
the Maoists in the area (Bastar region and Dantewara in particular) is the 
poverty and general backwardness of the tribes living there”.7 What he 
meant by this was that ultimately the kind of militarised Maoism that has 
emerged in India would have to stand or fall in terms of a critique from 
the left itself. The dispossession and oppression of tribals and the redoubled 
drive to open their districts to exploitation by large industrial capital, with 
the displacement and impoverishment this causes, have been major sources 
of the tenacity of Maoism in India, a movement to which tribal support has 
always been crucial.7 But it is pure naivety to reduce one to the other or 
identify the tribals and the Maoists as if their agendas were the same or the 
victory of one would mean the emancipation of the other. 
Responses, critical or otherwise, from the left can be classified 
70:  Miklian, 009, p; by far the best account.
7:  Balagopal, 00, p: “Inevitably, the common people have got caught between the 
two parties.” For “vanguard war”, see Debray, 977, chapter  (fundamental).
7:  Balagopal, 006b, p8.
7:  Duyker, 987, p09, underlines the voluntary nature of tribal support for the Naxalites 
in Bengal: “The vast majority of Santals extended their support voluntarily. In the final 
analysis, the Naxalite mass-base began to crumble because this support was voluntarily 
withdrawn, in the face of severe police and army operations.” 
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broadly into four categories. Maoists and Maoist sympathisers abstract from 
the profound deformities of the movement to engage in solidarity with it 
at any cost. They posit an almost mystical identity between the Maoists and 
“the people” and do precisely what Balagopal advised democratic circles 
not to do, namely use the poverty and general backwardness of the tribal 
areas as an excuse for not engaging with the CPI (Maoist) politically.7 
A second line of response has been the CPI (Marxist)’s savage 
repression of all popular movements that challenge their own agendas 
for the state of West Bengal, using the machinery of the state to crush 
both the Maoists and much wider layers of the population (again largely 
tribal) they see as sympathising with them or opposing their own poli-
cies. Thus, whereas the CPI (Maoist) sabotaged a struggle like the one in 
Lalgarh by infiltrating the People’s Committee Against Police Atrocities 
and eliminating all political rivals, the CPI (Marxist) fell back on its own 
vigilante groups and on state counterinsurgency forces to quell the move-
ment there.7 Both parties (and large parts of the state apparatus, of course) 
have an interest in branding what began as and was for months a demo-
cratic popular upsurge as “Maoist”. And, of course, the two “Marxist” 
parties have been slaughtering each other’s cadre. 
Sharply different from both the above has been the civil liberties cri-
tique that was largely represented in the writings of the late Balagopal through 
most of the 1990s down to his death in 2009. Balagopal’s critique recorded 
features that displayed an unmitigated authoritarianism on the part of a move-
ment he had been closely associated with, features he saw as undermining 
its sources of support. He referred to the “ruthlessness” of the party (the 
PWG) that had evolved by the early 1990s,76 to the calculated use of terror 
as a political instrument,77 the “medieval forms of violence” that characterised 
the so-called People’s Courts,78 the lack of possibility of any opposition to the 
party “so long as the police are taken care of”,79 the “new” culture that had 
“permeated the Naxalite organisations” as they recruited large numbers of 
new cadres “more attracted by its weapons than its politics”, and the “recog-
7:  Navlakha, 00, especially p; Roy, 00a.
7:  The best accounts of their role in Lalgarh are Sarkar and Sarkar, 009, and Rana, 
009. 
76:  Balagopal, 990a, p9, about the PWG, “whose reputation for ruthlessness is as real as 
it is disquieting”. 
77:  Balagopal, 997, p: “That the Naxalites, in particular the CPI(M-L) (People’s 
War), employ terror as a political instrument is a fact...”
78:  Balagopal, 990b, p88.
79:  Balagopal, 006a, p8.
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nisable deterioration of quality” this had brought with it.80 More substantially, 
he saw the movement in Andhra culminating in “stagnation” by the 2000s 
and forced to sidestep the crisis by expanding into new territory, failing to 
consolidate a second generation of support.8 And finally, there were clear ele-
ments of a critique of the substitutionism of a vanguard struggle where most 
decisions were “taken and implemented over the heads of the people but 
justified in the name of the people”,8 a politics that had simply “corrupted the 
masses into receivers of justice rather than fighters for it”.8 
These are among the most political criticisms that have been made 
of the obsessively violent forms Maoism has come to take and they are pro-
foundly more significant for any future left movement in India than the 
uncritical solidarity of fellow travellers. The indiscriminate killing of village 
headmen, the widespread laying of landmines, the recruitment of minors, the 
sabotage of all means of communication, the ban on employment-generating 
public works have all started to drive a wedge between the party and its tribal 
sympathisers precisely in the “liberated” zones.8 
A fourth sort of response would have to come from Marxists who 
have never identified with any of the Stalinist political traditions in India 
and do not see revolutionary movements developing in a class vacuum, in 
complete isolation from industrial workers and the more organised groups of 
wage earners and employees in the economy at large. The bulk of the Indian 
labour force remains unorganised into unions, and it is stupefying to imagine 
that a revolution against capitalism can succeed while the mass of the workers 
are in a state of near-complete atomisation. The impoverished notions of 
democracy that either reduce it to a battle for electoral supremacy or dismiss 
it as a fraud, the failure to encourage and develop a culture of working class 
organisation and debate, to encourage forms of intervention that contest capi-
talism in concrete ways, and build a movement that can address the widest 
possible range of issues starting from the desperate struggle for survival of the 
millions of landless in India, are all part of the legacy of a left that was mori-
80:  Balagopal, 00, p.
8:  Balagopal, 006a, p86; 00, p: “While expansion into new areas…is taking 
place steadily, they are not able to recover lost ground in Telangana and in their earlier tribal 
strongholds.”
8:  Balagopal, 997, p.
8:  Balagopal, 006a, p8.
8:  Independent Citizens’ Initiative, 006, pp978–979; Sundar 006; Balagopal, 
006b, pp8–86. To the point about the training of minors in the use of arms, the 
general secretary of the CPI (Maoist) responded with this flash of brilliance: “Making a fuss 
over age has no relevance in a situation where the enemies of the people are targeting children 
too, without any mercy”—Ganapathi, 007, p69.
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bund intellectually and deeply conservative in its culture. 
Shankar Guha Neogi (murdered in 1991) and AK Roy of the Marxist 
Coordination Committee (expelled from the CPI(M) in 1973), both charis-
matic union leaders, stood in sharp contrast to that political tradition. They 
drew their popular support precisely from the landless tribals employed in the 
iron ore and coal mines of Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand. The CPI (Maoist)’s 
conception of the working class is a rhetorical one, since it is the party that 
embodies the “leadership” of the class and conducts the class struggle on its 
behalf, unelected, unaccountable and never subject to recall. This has been a 
consistent feature of the Naxalite groups since the late 60s. 
Secondly, the Maoist grasp of theory is unbelievably primitive, a 
collage of abstractions that bear little relation to reality at any level (analysis 
or strategy). “Semi-feudalism”, “comprador bourgeoisie”, “four-class alli-
ance”, “protracted people’s war”, etc are all slavishly copied from Mao’s 
theorisations for China that will soon be almost a century old! For example, 
a leader of Liberation defends the label “comprador bourgeoisie” by saying 
it refers to the “increasing organic integration between Indian big business 
and imperialist capital”.8 But “organic integration” between capitals across 
national boundaries is precisely what defines capitalism, unless one is going 
to see the latter as an aggregation of national economies. 
Third, even the mass organisations fail to be truly democratic as long 
as they are “controlled by a secretive and hierarchical party”.86 Yet “parties 
like the CPI (Maoist) require secrecy not just from the state, but also to 
penetrate democratic mass movements” to gain control of them, as Santosh 
Rana showed for Lalgarh.87 And finally, of course, the Marxist critique 
will have to be able to absorb the civil liberties one, not simply ignore it. 
As Balagopal’s colleague, Andhra’s most distinguished civil rights lawyer, 
noted years ago, no political movement working for the overthrow of an 
exploitative order “has any right to reproduce the brutalities practised” by 
that order.88
8:  Bhattacharya, 006, p9.
86:  Bhatia, 00, p6, who goes on to say, “The ‘vanguard’ party lets the people bear the 
brunt” of actions undertaken on their behalf “without their knowledge and consent.” 
87:  Menon, 009, p8.
88:  Kannabiran, 99, p98.
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